Lawrence M. Ausubel, Professor, received his PhD in Economics from Stanford University in 1984, also earning a Master of Legal Studies from Stanford Law School and an MS in mathematics. He taught in the Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University for 8 years before joining the Maryland faculty in 1992. His main research field is microeconomic theory, particularly in game theory and the economics of asymmetric information. He has written extensively on the bilateral bargaining, multiple-object auctions, the credit card market, and other aspects of industrial organization and financial markets.
Areas of Interest
- Microeconomic Theory
- Game Theory
- Economics of Asymmetric Information
Degree TypePhDDegree DetailsStanford University, 1984
- An experiment on auctions with endogenous budget constraints, , Experimental Economics 20(4 ), 973-1006, December .
- Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions, , Review of Economic Studies 81(4 ), 1366-1400, October .
- Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction, , American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 104(5 ), 446-451, May .
- Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auctions, , Handbook of Market Design, ed. by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman, May .
- Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design, , Utilities Policy 18(4 ), 195-200, December .
- Virtual Power Plant Auctions, , Utilities Policy 18(4 ), 201-208, December .
- Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank, , The Economists' Voice 6(3 ), February .
- No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue, , The Economists' Voice 6(2 ), February .
- Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan, , The Economists’ Voice 5(5 ), 1-3, September .
- An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities, , American Economic Review 96(3 ), 602-629, June .
- Ascending Proxy Auctions, , Combinatorial Auctions, ed. by P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, January .
- The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, , Combinatorial Auctions, January .
- The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction, , Combinatorial Auctions, January .
- An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects, , American Economic Review 94(5 ), 1452-1475, December .
- Auctioning Many Divisible Goods, , Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2 ), 480-493, April .
- Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding, , The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 1(1 ), 1-42, August .
- Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets, , Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, ed. by Richard Herring, Brookings Institution Press, 313-343, August .
- Put Corruption Under the Hammer, , Financial Times, December .
- Bargaining with Incomplete Information, , Handbook of Game Theory, ed. by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart 3, 1897-1945, January .
- Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, , American Bankruptcy Law Journal 71, 249-270, April .
- Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions, , Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6(3 ), 497-527
- Efficient Sequential Bargaining, , Review of Economic Studies 60(2 ), 435-461, April .
- Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent, , Econometrica 60(3 ), 597-625, May .
- Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information, , Review of Economic Studies 59(4 ), 795-812, October .
- The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, , American Economic Review 81(1 ), 50-81, March .
- Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, , American Economic Review 80(5 ), 1022-1041, December .
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly, , Econometrica 57(3 ), 511-531, May .
- One is Almost Enough for Monopoly, , RAND Journal of Economics 18(2 ), 255-274, July .
- Shunjie Tu
- Santiago Velez-Ferro