Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information
          
                  Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond Deneckere
      
  
, 
            4
      (    
                  59
      
  
)
            Review of Economic Studies
      
            795-812
      
            October
      
            1992
      
            
          
                          
      
  
  Abstract
              This article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist's marginal cost is private information. We show that the Coase Conjecture implies the No Trade Theorem: In any equilibrium in which the lowest-cost seller's initial offer approaches her marginal cost, the aggregate probability of trade must vanish. However, we also construct non-Coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model. These (stationary) equilibria are comparatively efficient.
