Daniel R. Vincent
Daniel R. Vincent, Professor, received his PhD in economics from Princeton University in 1987. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received an MA from Oxford and a BA in History from the University of Toronto. Before joining the University of Maryland, he taught at the University of Western Ontario, the Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern University and at the California Institute of Technology.
His main area of research is the application of game theory to trading environments. He has studied dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and the theory of auctions. His current research is on revenue maximizing selling mechanisms for sellers with more than one object - an area sometimes referred to as "multidimensional mechanism design." Other research interests include industrial organization theory, with a focus on two-sided markets and on antitrust issues. In 1999, he was a visiting scholar at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Recent papers include "Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model" (Econometrica,2010), "Multidimensional Mechanism Design" and "Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multi-Good Monopolist" (both jointly authored with Alejandro Manelli and both in theJournal of Economic Theory) as well as "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Network" with Marius Schwartz in theReview of Network Economics.
- Application of Game Theory to Trading Environments
- Auction Theory
- Game Theory
- Antitrust Economics
- Ph.D. Princeton University, 1987
- MA Oxford University
- BA University of Toronto
|Course Name||Course Title||Semester||Syllabus|
|ECON415||Market Design||Fall 2017|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Spring 2017|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Spring 2017|
|ECON662||Theories of Industrial Organization||Fall 2016|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Fall 2016|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Fall 2016|
|ECON415||Market Design||Fall 2016|
|ECON708||Advanced Topics in Applied and Theoretical Microeconomics||Spring 2016|
|ECON868||Workshop in Industrial Organization||Spring 2016|
|ECON662||Theories of Industrial Organization||Fall 2015||Syllabus|
- Mixed Bundling and Imperfect Competition , Daniel R. Vincent , Working paper , May 2014.
- Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly: A Corrigendum , Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 147(6) , 2492-2493 , November 2012.
- Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model , Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Econometrica 78(6) , 1905-1938 , November 2010.
- Quantity ‘Forcing’ and Exclusion: Bundled Discounts and Non Linear Pricing. , Marius Schwartz and Daniel R. Vincent , Issues in Competition Law and Policy , April 2008.
- Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly , Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 137(1) , 153-185 , November 2007.
- Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multiple-Good Monopolist , Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 127(1) , 1-35 , March 2006.
- The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Networks , Marius Schwartz and Daniel R. Vincent , Review of Network Economics 5(1) , 72-102 , January 2006.
- Duality in Procurement Design , Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Mathematical Economics 40(3) , 411-428 , June 2003.
- How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids with an Application to Real Estate Auctions , Preston R. McAfee, Daniel C. Quan, and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4) , 391-416 , December 2002.
- Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations , Motty Perry and Daniel R. Vincent , International Economic Review 43(4) , 1035-1052 , November 2002.
- Tarrifying Auctions , Preston R. McAfee, Wendy Takacs, and Daniel R. Vincent , The RAND Journal of Economics
- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships , Daniel R. Vincent , International Economic Review 39(2) , 275-293 , May 1998.
- Sequentially Optimal Auctions , Preston R. McAfee and Daniel R. Vincent , Games and Economic Behavior 18(2) , 246-276 , February 1997.
- Optimal Procurement Mechanisms , Alejandro M. Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent , Econometrica 63(3) , 591-620 , May 1995.
- Bidding off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret. , Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 65(2) , 575-584 , April 1995.
- Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers , Preston R. McAfee, Daniel R. Vincent, Michael A. Williams, and Melanie Williams Havens , Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 2(4) , 449-482 , December 1993.
- The Declining Price Anomaly , Preston R. McAfee and Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 60(1) , 191-212 , June 1993.
- Modelling Competitive Behavior , Daniel R. Vincent , Rand Journal of Economics 23(4) , 590-599 , December 1992.
- Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions , Preston R. McAfee and Daniel R. Vincent , American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 82(2) , 512-518 , May 1992.
- Delayed Agreements and Nonexpected Utility , Chaim Fershtman, Zvi Safra, and Daniel R. Vincent , Games and Economic Behavior 3(4) , 423-437 , November 1991.
- Dynamic Auctions , Daniel R. Vincent , Review of Economic Studies 57(1) , 49-61 , January 1990.
- Bargaining With Common Values , Daniel R. Vincent , Journal of Economic Theory 48(1) , 47-62 , June 1989.
Department of Economics